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ABSTRACT
The economic crisis of the 1980s has revived interest in the
economic long wave or Kondratiev cycle. Since 1975 the System Dynamics
National Model has been the vehicle for the development of an endogen-
ous, dynamic theory of the economic long wave. The model has now
reached the point where an integrated theory of the long wave can be
described. The theory incorporates many of the partial theories that
have been proposed by others. Simulations of the model are presented to
show the wide range of empirical evidence accounted for by the model.
In particular, the theory suggests the long wave arises from the
interaction of two fundamental facets of modern industrial economies.
First, the existence of physical lags in the economy, limited informa-
tion available to decisionmakers, and bounded rationality in economic
decisionmaking creates the potential for inherently oscillatory behav-
ior. Second, a wide range of self-reinforcing processes exist which
destabilize the inherent oscillatory tendencies of the economy, leading
to the long wave. These processes involve many sectors of the economy
including capital investment, labor markets and workforce participation,
real interest rates, inflation, debt, savings and consumption, and
international trade. The paper discusses the relative strengths of
these mechanisms and the amplification of the long wave through their
interactions. The linkages of the long wave theory to innovation,
technological progress, and political value change are discussed.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF THE ECONOMIC LONG WAVE
1. Introduction
The economic malaise of the 1970s and 80s has revived interest in the
economic long wave or Kondratiev cycle (Kondratiev 1935). Numerous
theories of the long wave have emerged in the past 10 years, including
theories stressing innovation, labor dynamics, resource scarcity, and class
struggle.1 Since 1975 the System Dynamics National Model (NM) has provided
an increasingly rich theory of the long wave (Forrester 1981, 1979, 1977,
1976; Graham and Senge 1980; Senge 1982; Sterman 1984). Though the model
focuses primarily on economic forces, the theory emerging from the NM is
not monocausal: it relates capital investment; employment, wages, and
workforce participation; inflation and interest rates; aggregate demand;
monetary and fiscal policy; innovation and productivity; and even political
values. The NM is unique among recent theories of the long wave in that it
views the long wave as a syndrome consisting of interrelated symptoms and
springing from the interactions of many factors. The NM integrates diverse
hypotheses about the genesis of the long wave. The NM also provides an
analytical framework in which alternative theories can be tested in a
rigorous and reproducible manner.
This paper describes the integrated theory of the long wave that has
now emerged from the NM. The behavioral underpinnings of the theory are
discussed and contrasted against traditional economic theory. The major
sources of the long wave are presented and analyzed through simulations.
Though not intended as a definitive treatment of empirical evidence for
long waves, the paper presents some of the basic corroborative evidence to
show how the NM endogenously generates a wide range of economic data.
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2. Behavioral Foundations
The NM is a structural, behavioral model. It is a dynamic,
disequilibrium model. These features distinguish the NM from econometric
and optimizing models (such as general equilibrium models) in several
important respects.
2.1. Macrobehavior from Microstructure
The NM is a structural model. Structure as used here includes the
physical structure of the economy (the stock and flow networks of capital,
goods, people, and money), flows of information about the state of the
system, and the behavioral decision rules people use to manage their
affairs. The structure of the economy is represented at the microeconomic
level of individuals and firms. By modeling decisionmaking and the
physical structure of the system at the microlevel, the macrolevel dynamics
of the economy emerge naturally out of the interactions of the system
components. Because such models provide a behavioral description of the
economy firmly rooted in managerial practice, they are well suited for
examining the dynamic effects of policy initiatives.
2.2. Disequilibrium Dynamics
The model does not assume that the economy is always in equilibrium,
or that it moves smoothly from one equilibrium to another. Though
individuals may be striving for equilibrium, disequilibrium is the rule
rather than the exception. To properly model adjustment dynamics, one must
not presume the stability of the system. Rather one must model the
pressures that may lead to equilibrium, including the way people perceive
and react to imbalances, and the delays, constraints, and inadequate
information that often confound them.
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2.3. Bounded Rationality
The behavioral assumptions of the model rest on the theory of bounded
rationality (Cyert and March 1963, Merton 1936, Nelson and Winter 1982,
Simon 1947, 1957, 1978, 1979). The essence of the theory is summarized in
the principle of bounded rationality, as formulated by Herbert Simon (1957,
p. 198):
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problem whose solution is required for objectively rational
behavior in the real world or even for a reasonable approxi-
mation to such objective rationality.
The theory of bounded rationality provides both theoretical underpinnings
and a rich data base for the development of behavioral models in
economics.2 Bounded rationality has several important implications for
behavioral modeling of economic dynamics.
2.3.1 Limited information-processing capability: Humans have a
limited ability to process information. As a consequence, "perception of
information is not comprehensive but selective" (Hogarth 1980, p. 4;
original emphasis). Human decisions are made on the basis of a small
number of cues rather than an extensive appraisal of the situation.
Further, people rely on information they judge to be relatively certain,
and on information they believe to be causally important. But at the same
time the mental models people construct to guide their decisions are often
systematically incorrect. Learning, which might gradually eliminate such
biases and errors through "natural selection," is often slow and hindered
by the limited information available, by the common tendency to ignore
unfavorable information, and by the use of selective hindsight. 3
2.3.2 Decentralized Decisionmaking: The impossibility of
comprehending the system as a whole and of processing the masses of
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information that confront us in the real world have forced people to evolve
decomposition strategies to simplify decisionmaking. The chief strategy
for simplification is decentralized decisionmaking. The total task of
managing an organization is divided into smaller tasks assigned to subunits
within the organization. The subunits ignore, or treat as constant or
exogenous, those aspects of the total situation that are not directly
relevant to their subgoal (Simon 1947, p. 79):
Individual choice takes place in an environment of "givens"
--premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his
choice....
2.3.3 Rules of Thumb: In addition to ignoring much of the
potentially available information, people within organizational subunits
use simple heuristics or rules of thumb to process information. Rules of
thumb rely on relatively certain information that is locally available to
the subunit. Rules of thumb are not the result of rational calculation but
evolve in response to environmental pressures. They are the routines and
standard operating procedures of organizations (Morecroft 1983).
2.3.4 Bounded Rationality and Traditional Economics: The theory of
bounded rationality stands in stark contrast to the classical rationality
of traditional economics. Unlike classical economic theory, the NM does
not presume that individuals and firms have perfect information or the
ability to optimize their performance. Such behavioral models are often
criticized because they assume people rely on decisionmaking heuristics,
"irrationally" failing to optimize their performance. Performance, it is
argued, could be improved by using more information or more sophisticated
decision rules. But a good model of economic dynamics must be descriptive:
to simulate (in the sense of mimic) the behavior of a system accurately,
decisionmaking must be portrayed as it is and not as it might be if people
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were omniscient optimizers. The empirical work on decisionmaking
heuristics and cognitive biases provides a firm empirical foundation for
behavioral models in economics.
3. Multiple Modes of Behavior
Figures la-d show the behavior of important economic variables in the
United states from 1800 to 1984. The data exhibit many modes of behavior.
The behavior of real GNP, for example, is dominated by the long-term growth
of the economy, which has averaged 3.4 percent/year for nearly two
centuries. In addition, GNP fluctuates around the growth trend with the
business cycle, which has an average period of four to seven years. And
there is a hint of longer term fluctuations in the rate of output--output
is lower than normal between 1830 and 1840, during the 1870s through 1890s,
during the Great Depression, and from the 1970s to the present. These
dates coincide with the timing of the long wave established by van Duijn
(1983) through examination of global economic data.
The long wave is more apparent in the behavior of unemployment,
aggregate prices, and interest rates. Unemployment fluctuates strongly
with the business cycle, but also exhibits major peaks during the 1890s and
the 1930s. Unemployment rates today are the highest since the Great
Depression. Consumer prices likewise fluctuate with the business cycle but
also exhibit a fairly regular long wave, with peaks roughly coincident with
the peaks of the long wave in real activity. An additional mode of
behavior develops after World War II, however, as inflation has carried the
price level to unprecedented levels, dominating the long wave pattern in
prices. (Note however that the reduction in inflation since 1980 is
consistent with the deflationary forces of the long wave downturn). The
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postwar inflation coincides with the expansion in the relative size of
government from about 10 percent of GNP in the 1920s to about 35 percent in
the 1980s, and with the increasing reliance on deficit financing and
monetization of the public debt (Richmond 1984).
Interest rates show a similar pattern, rising and falling with a
roughly 50 year period. Note that interest rates are approximately in
phase with the price level. Indeed, interest rates and prices were among
the chief data Kondratiev relied upon to argue for the existence of long
waves. Like prices, interest rates have risen above historic levels in the
last decade as inflation has reached double digit rates.
The available data reflect the combination and interaction of several
distinct modes of behavior, including long-run population growth and
technological progress, the business cycle, the relative growth of
government, post-war inflation, and the long wave. The interaction of the
modes makes it difficult to establish the existence of the long wave
through purely empirical means, especially since reliable numerical data
are not available over a long enough period.4
Because the National Model represents behavior at the microlevel of
individuals and firms, it generates the multiple modes of economic behavior
that appear in the historical data. Compare the historical data against
figures 2a-c, which show a simulation of the National Model from 1800 to
1984. As shown in table 1, all the macroeconomic aggregates are generated
endogenously, as are a host of variables at the sectoral level. The only
exogenous variables are population (which is assumed to grow at a uniform
two percent per year rate); technological progress (assumed to grow at a
uniform one percent per year rate); and per capita government activity
(which grows in response to a constant pressure starting in 1930). In
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addition, a small amount of random noise has been added to production and
ordering rates. The noise serves to trigger the business cycle and causes
the point-by-point behavior to be somewhat irregular.
Simulated unemployment, real GNP, interest rates, and prices all
exhibit the long wave and business cycle. The period of the long wave is
approximately 50 years. The long wave does not die out over time. In
addition, GNP exhibits the long-term growth of the economy, and prices show
the postwar inflation due to the growth of government and the partial
monetization of growing government deficits. Because historical data
series are not used as inputs, the behavior, and in particular the long
wave, is the endogenous result of the interaction of the system components
and is not driven by the exogenous variables. Without attempting to
reproduce the point-by-point behavior of the economy, the simulation
captures the major patterns in the development of the economy over almost
200 years.5
4. Origin of the Long Wave
The long wave is characterized by successive waves of overexpansion
and collapse of the economy, particularly the capital-producing sector.
Overexpansion means an increase in the capacity to produce and in the
production of plant, equipment, and goods relative to the amount needed to
replace worn-out units and provide for growth over the long run.
Overexpansion is undesirable because, eventually, production and employment
must be cut back below normal to reduce the excess.
How does the long wave arise? In particular, how does overexpansion
of the capital-producing sector of the economy arise? The explanation can
be divided into two parts. First, the internal structure and policies of
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individual firms tend to amplify changes in demand, creating the potential
for oscillation in the adjustment of capacity to changes in the desired
level. Second, a wide range of self-reinforcing processes significantly
amplify the response of individual firms to changes in demand, increasing
the amplitude and lengthening the period of the fluctuations generated by
each firm. Through the process of entrainment, the fluctuations generated
by individual firms become coherent and mutually reinforce one another
(Homer 1980).
4.1 Amplification of Demand by Individual Firms
One basic cause of overexpansion is the tendency for production
systems to amplify changes in demand. For example, consider a retailer of
consumer goods. Imagine (for simplicity) that customer orders are
constant. Now consider the effect of a sudden, unanticipated step increase
in orders, say of 10 percent. In the long run, the retailer will increase
orders to its suppliers by 10 percent and will probably hold 10 percent
more inventory to provide the same coverage of demand. The suppliers, in
turn, will increase their production by 10 percent as well. But what
happens during the adjustment period?
First, the retailer will wait to see whether the unanticipated
increase in demand is lasting enough to warrant a change in orders or
whether it is merely a transient change. Once the persistence of the new
level of demand becomes clear, the retailer will decide to order 10 percent
more to meet the customer's needs. But it takes time to receive goods from
suppliers because of shipping delays and because the suppliers must
increase their own production. Increasing production takes time because
more parts and raw materials must be ordered, more workers hired, and
possibly, new capacity acquired. The delays in reacting to the new level
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of orders, and in increasing output and shipping it to the retailer, mean
the retailer's inventories will decline. Backlogs will rise. To correct
these imbalances, the retailer must place more orders with suppliers,
expanding orders above customer demand. Orders must remain above customer
demand long enough to replenish inventories and work off the excess
backlogs. Thus customer demand is amplified by the stock adjustments
caused by the delays in receiving goods.
But the situation is worse: a higher volume of business requires a
larger stock of inventory to maintain the same coverage ratio. So orders
to suppliers must rise even farther above demand to build inventories up to
a higher level consistent with the higher demand. Further, retailers may
find themselves unable to get the units they need to meet demand and
replenish inventories. As a direct result of the surge in orders, the lead
time for supplies may rise, since the suppliers face delays in ordering
their own parts and materials, hiring new workers, and expanding capacity.
Faced with rising delivery times, retailers may hedge by ordering still
more and placing orders with more than one supplier, a process described by
economist Thomas W. Mitchell (1923, p. 645):
Retailers find that there is a shortage of merchandise at their
sources of supply. Manufacturers inform them that it is with
regret that they are able to fill their orders only to the
extent of 80 per cent; there has been an unaccountable shortage
of materials that has prevented them from producing to their
full capacity. They hope to be able to give full service next
season, by which time, no doubt, these unexplainable conditions
will have been remedied. However, retailers, having been dis-
appointed in deliveries and lost 20 per cent or more of their
possible profits thereby, are not going to be caught that way
again. During the season they have tried with little success to
obtain supplies from other sources. But next season, if they
want 90 units of an article, they order 100, so as to be sure,
each, of getting the 90 in the pro rata share delivered. Prob-
ably they are disappointed a second time. Hence they increase
the margins of their orders over what they desire, in order that
their pro rata shares shall be for each the full 100 per cent
that he really wants. Furthermore, to make doubly sure, each
merchant spreads his orders over more sources of supply.
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Such hoarding behavior is quite common. A recent example is provided by
the paper industry, which, faced with surging demand and operating at 97
percent of capacity instituted "an allocation system in which, for example,
everyone receives just 90 percent of an order." As a result, "many
customers are also 'double booking' -- placing orders with two
manufacturers to make sure their needs are met, then often canceling one of
them" (The New York Times, 5 April 1984, p. D-1).
Other sources of amplification include growth expectations and the
spread of optimism, as described by Wesley C. Mitchell (1941, p. 5):
Virtually all business problems involve elements that are not
precisely known, but must be approximately estimated even for
the present, and forecast still more roughly for the future.
Probabilities take the place of certainties, both among the
data upon which reasoning proceeds and among the conclusions at
which it arrives. This fact gives hopeful or despondent moods
a large share in shaping business decisions.... Most men find
their spirits raised by being in optimistic company. There-
fore, when the first beneficiaries of a trade revival develop a
cheerful frame of mind about the business outlook, they become
centers of infection, and start an epidemic of optimism.
Additional amplification arises because the increase in customer
demand and lagged response of production will boost prices, causing further
expansion of orders and output as profits rise (Mass 1980).
Thus each stage in the production-distribution network of the economy
tends to amplify changes in demand. The amplification increases at each
stage as demand, swollen by adjustments for inventories, supply lines,
expectations, and anticipated profits, is passed back from retailers to
wholesalers, manufacturers of finished goods, manufacturers of intermediate
goods, and finally to capital and raw materials producers. Amplification
in successive stages of the production chain explains why the volatility of
an industry tends to increase as it becomes further removed from consumer
demand (Hansen 1951). The capital-producing industries (construction,
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machinery manufacturing, raw materials, etc.) are the farthest removed from
final demand and hence experience the most instability.
The preceding analysis shows that the internal management policies of
firms, coupled with the unavoidable lags in reacting to changes in demand
and in increasing capacity, lead to the tendency for production and
capacity to fluctuate. The amplification of demand by stock adjustments is
a fundamental characteristic of firms, and is responsible for several
oscillatory modes of behavior including the four- to seven-year business
cycle and the Kuznets or intermediate cycle of approximately 15 to
25 years.6 Parallel oscillatory structures exist in the household sector
and govern the adjustment of consumers' stocks of durable goods and
housing.
The mechanisms responsible for the business and intermediate cycles
have been identified and are distinct. The business cycle is primarily the
result of inventory and employment interactions. The intermediate cycle is
primarily the result of attempts to balance the mix of capital and labor as
factors of production. The difference in period arises from the
differences in the relatively short time required to adjust inventories and
change employment compared to the longer time required to acquire and
discard capital and alter the mix of factors.
Simple models show that the amplification of demand by inventory and
backlog adjustments leads, in isolation, to highly damped oscillations in
capital investment with periods of approximately 20 years (Mass 1975,
Sterman 1984). Yet the long wave is a 50 year fluctuation which does not
die away. The long period, large amplitude, and persistent nature of the
cycle arise from a wide range of self-reinforcing processes which operate
in the economy as a whole. These positive feedback loops couple different
1 1
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firms to one another and to the household and financial sectors of the
economy. The net effect of these self-reinforcing processes is to further
amplify the inherently oscillatory tendencies of individual firms,
stretching out the period and increasing the amplitude of the fluctuations.
Analysis of the model isolates several independent processes which
contribute to the 50 year cycle of overexpansion and economic decline.
4.2 Capital Self-ordering
The National Model distinguishes producers of capital plant,
equipment, and basic materials from other firms in the private sector. The
capital sector differs from others due to the existence of "self-ordering."
In order to expand capacity, producers of capital plant and equipment must
order additional plant and equipment from each other. In the aggregate,
the capital-producing sector acquires capital from itself, hence self-
ordering. Though all sectors of the economy are linked to one another to
some degree, self-ordering is strongest in the industries that produce
capital plant and equipment, basic industries such as steel, and other
heavy industry (Sterman 1982).
To illustrate the role of self-ordering in the long wave, consider the
economy in equilibrium. If the demand for consumer goods and services
increases, the consumer-goods industry must expand its capacity and so
places orders for new factories, equipment, vehicles, etc. To supply the
higher volume of orders, the capital-producing sector must also expand its
capital stock and hence place orders for more buildings, machines, rolling
stock, trucks, etc., causing the total demand for capital to rise still
further in a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing orders, a greater need
for expansion, and still more orders.
IlI
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Figure 3 shows the behavior of real GNP, consumption, and investment
generated by the National Model. Population growth, technical progress,
and the relative growth of government have been suppressed to focus
attention on the long wave. In the simulation, therefore, there are no
exogenous variables whatsoever, and the behavior is entirely the endogenous
result of the interaction of the assumed decision rules with the physical
structure of the economy.7 Real GNP fluctuates with the business cycle but
is dominated by a long wave with an approximately 50 year period. The long
wave tends to be asymmetrical, with a gradual expansion over about 20 years
followed by a relatively swift decline and a depression period of 15 to 20
years. While the long wave is visible in consumption, it is by far largest
in real investment. The magnitude of the fluctuation in investment is
larger than that in consumption even though investment is only about a
fifth as large as consumption. The large amplitude of investment relative
to consumption is a reflection of the destabilizing influence of capital
self-ordering: changes in the demand for capital deriving from the goods
sector are amplified by self-ordering to cause a much larger swing in the
total demand for capital.
The strength of self-ordering depends on a number of factors, but
chiefly on the capital intensity (capital/output ratio) of the capital-
producing sector. A rough measure of the strength of self-ordering can be
calculated by considering how much capital production expands in
equilibrium in response to an increase in investment in the rest of the
economy. It is easily shown that the equilibrium multiplier effect created
by self-ordering is given by:8
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1/(1-KCOR/KALC)
where
KCOR = capital output ratio of the capital sector (years)
KALC = average lifetime of capital in the capital sector (years).
Assuming an average life of capital of 20 years and an average
capital/output ratio of three years (approximate values for the aggregate
economy) gives an equilibrium multiplier effect of 1.18. In the long run,
an increase in the demand for capital from the rest of the economy yields
an additional 18 per cent increase in total investment through
self-ordering.
The long wave is an inherently disequilibrium phenomenon, however, and
during the transient adjustment to the long run the strength of self-
ordering is greater than in equilibrium. During the adjustment to the long
run, the disequilibrium effects that lead to amplification of demand all
act to further augment the demand for capital, creating a number of
additional positive feedback loops.
4.2.1 Amplification Caused by Inventory and Backlog Adjustments:
Rising orders deplete the inventories and swell the backlogs of capital-
sector firms, leading to further pressure to expand and still more orders.
During the downturn, low backlogs and involuntary inventory accumulation
further depress demand, leading to still more excess inventory. Figure 4
shows the effect of inventory and backlog pressures on desired production
of capital by the capital sector. The "output discrepancy" measures the
need to adjust production above or below the order rate in order to bring
inventories and backlogs into balance with their desired levels. A
positive output discrepancy indicates inadequate inventory and bloated
backlogs are boosting desired production above orders. As shown, the
output discrepancy of the capital sector builds up during the expansion
14
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phase of the long wave, forcing desired production well above orders, even
as orders are rising, and substantially reinforcing the demand for capital.
Peaking shortly before the peak of real GNP, the output discrepancy
collapses precipitously during the long wave decline as excess inventories
rapidly accumulate.
4.2.2. Amplification Caused by Rising Lead Times for Capital: As
shown in figure 5, the delivery delay for capital rises well above normal
during the long wave expansion. Delivery delay tends to peak four to 10
years in advance of real GNP, reaches normal levels roughly at the time of
the peak, and drops well below normal during the downturn of the cycle. As
the demand for capital outstrips capacity during the long wave expansion,
backlogs rise, causing lead times for plant and equipment to rise. Capital
producers find it takes longer than anticipated to acquire new capacity,
causing capacity to lag further behind desired levels, creating still more
pressure to order and further swelling the demand for capital. In
addition, longer lead times force capital producers to order farther ahead,
further augmenting orders, as described by T. W. Mitchell.
The delivery delay for goods likewise fluctuates with the long wave.
During the long wave expansion, capital is scarce, and the goods sector
cannot increase capacity fast enough to meet demand, causing the delivery
delay for goods to rise. But note that the amplitude of the fluctuation in
the availability of goods is only about eight percent of normal while the
amplitude of the delivery delay for capital averages about 25 percent,
showing the powerful role of self-ordering in destabilizing the capital
sector.
The lead time for capital also exhibits the 20 year Kuznets or
construction cycle, which creates smaller and narrower peaks in delivery
15
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delay between the major surges which occur during the long wave expansion.
The intermediate cycle is primarily the result of efforts to balance the
mix of capital and labor as the availability and price of these inputs
vary.
4.2.3. Amplification Caused by Growth Expectations: The special role
of the capital sector in creating the long wave is again demonstrated by
the behavior of growth expectations. During the expansion phase, rapidly
growing demand, rising backlogs,- and long lead times all encourage
expectations of additional growth in demand for capital. Expectations of
future growth lead to additional investment, further swelling demand in a
self-fulfilling prophecy. As shown in figure 6, capital producers'
long-term expectations of growth in the demand for capital fluctuate
substantially over the long wave. Expectations of demand growth in the
capital sector fluctuate between about -4 and +6 percent per year over the
long wave, peaking two to eight years before the peak of real GNP. Note
however that due to perception lags and institutional inertia growth
expectations are highest just before real investment peaks and begins to
decline. (Compare figure 6 to the timing of real investment shown in
figure 3.) Thus growth expectations exacerbate the excess capacity that
develops at the peak of the long wave. In contrast, expectations of growth
in the demand for goods show a substantially smaller amplitude and peak
slightly after the peak of real GNP.
4.2.4 The Sufficiency of Self-Ordering: The positive feedback loops
created by self-ordering significantly reinforce the natural tendency of
firms to amplify changes in demand. Once a capital expansion gets under
way, the self-ordering loops amplify and sustain it until production
catches up to orders, excess capacity is built up, and orders begin to
fall.
16
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At that point, the self-ordering loops reverse: a reduction in orders
further reduces the demand for capital, leading to a contraction in the
capital sector's output, followed by declining employment, wages, aggregate
demand, and production of goods and services. Capital production must
remain below the level required for replacement and long-run growth until
the excess physical and financial capital is depreciated--a process that
may take a decade or more due to the long lifetimes of plant and equipment.
Once the capital stock is worn out, investment rises, triggering the next
upswing.
To illustrate, consider the development of the U.S. economy after
World War II. The capital stock of the economy was old and severely
depleted after 15 years of depression and wartime production. Demand for
all types of capital equipment--roads, houses, schools, factories,
machines--surged. A massive rebuilding began. In order to both satisfy
long-run demand, fill pent-up demand, and rebuild the capital and infra-
structure, the capital-producing sector had to expand beyond the long-run
needs of the economy. The overexpansion of the capital-producing sector
was exacerbated by self-ordering: as the demand for consumer goods,
services, and housing rose, manufacturers of capital plant and equipment
had to expand their own capacity, further swelling the demand for
structures, equipment, materials, transportation, and other infrastructure.
Thus self-ordering helped trigger the boom of the 1950s and '60s. By the
late 1960s, the capital stock had been largely rebuilt, and investment
began to slow to levels consistent with replacement and long-run growth.
Excess capacity and unemployment began to show up in basic industries.
Faced with excess capacity, investment in these industries was cut back,
further reducing the need for capital and reinforcing the decline in
investment as the economy moved through the 1970s and into the 1980s.
17
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Self-ordering is one of the most important and fundamental causes of
the long wave. Simple models that include only the most basic self-
ordering feedbacks can generate a robust long wave (Sterman 1984).
Self-ordering is therefore a sufficient cause of long waves.
4.3 Employment and Wages
Self-ordering, though it may be sufficient to generate the long wave,
is not the only mechanism at work. Other positive feedback loops operate
through the labor markets to add additional amplification (figure 7). As
illustrated by figure 8, employment growth is rapid during the early years
of the long wave expansion, but slows once the available pool of unemployed
is largely utilized. Growing scarcity of qualified labor then force real
wages to rise. Wage growth is especially high during the late expansion
period. Scarcity of qualified workers and higher labor costs during the
late expansion encourage the substitution of capital for labor throughout
the economy, further augmenting the demand for capital. Real wages fall
after the peak in real GNP, further undercutting the incentives for capital
investment during the depression phase.
If the positive loops surrounding labor and wages play a significant
role in the long wave, one would expect the early phase of the long wave
expansion to involve simultaneous expansion of labor and capital. As real
wages rise, a period of stagnant employment but continued growth of capital
and output should follow. Such patterns have been documented for both the
U.S., Europe, and Japan (figures 9a and 1Oa). Compare these figures
against figures 9b and 10b which show the shifting balance of labor and
capital generated by the NM simulation shown in figure 2. Though the long-
term growth of population and technology cause both labor and capital to
rise, the long wave causes significant fluctuations in their relative rates
18
D-3577
of growth. Like the historical data, simulated labor and capital rise
together as the long wave expansion begins. Labor growth then slows as the
pool of unemployed is exhausted (employment continues to grow slightly as
high wages cause an increase in workforce participation). At the long wave
peak, labor falls sharply, while capital, due to construction lags,
continues to increase for a few more years. During the downturn, capital
stock declines while employment remains depressed. Finally, labor rises
while capital continues to decline, completing the cycle. Note also that
in both the simulated and actual data the amplitude of the business cycle
(as shown by the fluctuations in employment) increases as the economy moves
towards the peak of the long wave. The rising amplitude is a result of the
developing margin of excess capacity as the economy nears the peak.9
4.4 Real Interest Rates and Inflation
Another major mechanism that contributes to the long wave revolves
around the dynamics of interest rates and inflation. Historically,
long wave expansions have been periods of low or even negative real
interest rates, especially in the later part of the expansion. Near the
peaks, real interest rates have risen sharply and remained at high levels
through the downturns and into the depression periods. Figure 11 shows the
real interest rate from 1960 to the present.10 Real rates declined
gradually from 1960 to the mid-'70s, when they were generally negative.
After 1979 real rates rose sharply and remain at the highest levels since
the deflation of 1929 to 1933 caused real rates to soar.
In the current long-wave downturn, the high level of real interest
rates has been blamed on restrictive monetary policies and high government
deficits. Yet the National Model generates the same historical pattern
(low, then sharply rising real interest rates over the long wave expansion,
19
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peak, and downturn) without a tightening of monetary policy or large
deficits. Figure 12 shows the simulated behavior of real interest rates
over the long wave. Real rates fall steadily during the expansion,
becoming negative just before the peak. As the economy declines, real
rates rise sharply and remain high through the trough.
The role of real interest rates in the long wave is described in
detail by Senge (1983), and shown in figure 13. Early in the long wave
expansion, the demand for goods and especially capital is growing, putting
upward pressure on prices. As prices rise, the real interest rate falls,
encouraging still more investment. The resulting expansion in investment
demand and the demand for assets such as land and housing puts further
upward pressure on prices, and the resulting increase in inflation further
reduces real interest rates. During the downturn, the process reverses.
As demand for capital, land, housing, and other assets falls (due to the
buildup of excess capacity), prices soften and inflation subsides. Real
interest rates therefore rise, discouraging investment still further,
creating still more downward pressure on prices, and reinforcing the rise
in real interest rates.
The strength of the reinforcing mechanism involving inflation and real
interest rates depends on a lag between a change in inflation and the
response of nominal interest rates. If nominal rates rapidly and
accurately adjusted to the rate of inflation, then the real rate would
remain quite stable, and the process described above would be weak. The
historical evidence verifies that nominal interest rates do not immediately
adjust to changes in inflation, but rather lag significantly behind (Senge
1983). To see why nominal interest rates lag behind inflation, consider
the situation at the beginning of the long wave expansion. Demand for
20
D-3577
capital and goods is rising while capacity lags behind. The gap between
orders and capacity begins to push up prices. At the same time, firms
attempt to expand capacity, boosting credit demand and bidding up nominal
interest rates. The pressure on interest rates and the pressure on prices
arise from the same source--the surge in investment and consumer demand
during the long wave expansion--and therefore prices and interest rates
move roughly in phase. Real interest rates, however, are the level of
nominal interest rates less the fractional rate of price change. Price
change (inflation) reaches its peak approximately when the pressure to
invest is highest, while prices and nominal interest rates continue to rise
until the pressure to invest has been dissipated. Thus during the long
wave expansion, nominal rates rise more slowly than inflation, leading to
low real interest rates. Near the peak of the long wave, nominal rates
again lag behind declining inflation, leading to a sharp increase in real
interest rates. Figures c and d show that historically prices and
interest rates have in fact moved in phase, with inflation leading nominal
interest rates. Figures 2c and 14 show that simulated prices and interest
rates exhibit the same pattern.
Simulations of the National Model show the positive feedback loops
surrounding real interest rates and inflation to be powerful destabilizers
of the economy. Like self-ordering, the interest rate dynamics are
sufficient to create the long wave and contribute to the self-sustaining
nature of the long wave by substantially amplifying the inherent
oscillatory tendencies of individual firms.
4.5 Debt/Deflation Spiral
Another major process that contributes to the long wave, closely
related to the behavior of real interest rates, lies in the dynamics of
debt and aggregate prices.
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As shown in figure 15, debt levels and aggregate prices are relatively
low at the end of a long-wave downturn, the result of liquidation and price
cutting in the face of unemployment and idle capacity. As the expansion
phase gets under way, firms, particularly in the capital sectors, take on
more debt in order to finance the expansion. Debt relative to GNP rises
and the money supply expands. Expansion of debt is justified because
vigorous growth, high rates of capacity utilization, high profitability,
and low real interest rates all encourage expansion of external financing.
Toward the later years of the expansion, investment in capital begins
to soften as excess capacity develops. The upward momentum of prices and
money growth may then trigger a continuing expansion of debt through
speculation in land, stocks, precious metals, or other assets. Near the
peak of the long wave, overcapacity develops and investment falls,
depressing employment and aggregate demand. With declining income, the
ability to service the debt falls, and bankruptcies increase. Prices
soften as the growing debt burden depresses aggregate demand, further
squeezing debt service ability and forcing additional liquidations.
During the long-wave downturn, debt is liquidated and prices typically
fall. In such a debt/deflation spiral, as described by Irving Fisher
(1933), defaults and liquidations reduce the stock of money, squeezing
nominal incomes and wealth, forcing further cutbacks in aggregate demand
and further price cuts. In the extreme, the debt/deflation spiral can
cause the collapse of the banking system and international trade, as
occurred in the 1930s. Whether the liquidation is orderly or whether it
takes the form of bankruptcies and defaults, possibly leading to a panic,
cannot be predicted in advance. The greater the degree of speculation
during the expansion, the more likely is a panic during the downturn. The
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record post-Depression rate of business failures and bank closings and the
current third world debt crisis are symptoms of the pressures that may
trigger the debt/deflation dynamic.
4.6 Technology and Innovation
Following in the tradition of Schumpeter (1939), much of the
renaissance of interest in long waves has centered on the role of
technology and innovation (see note 1; also Mansfield 1983, and Rosenberg
and Frischtak 1983). Fifty year long waves in innovation have been
independently identified by several investigators (Mensch 1979, Hochgraf
1983). Renewed commitment to R&D and other policies to stimulate "leading
edge" high-tech sectors such as information processing and bioengineering
are often recommended as prime components of an effective strategy to
counter the long wave (Freeman et al. 1982, Van Duijn 1983, Dickson 1983).
In contrast to the innovation theories of the long wave, the National
Model suggests a long wave theory of innovation better describes the
situation. The NM shows how fundamental physical processes. in the economy
can create the long wave without any variation in innovation rates. The
bunching of innovations can thus be explained as the result of entrainment
of the innovation process by the long wave (Graham and Senge 1980, p.
283-84):
The long wave creates a shifting historical context for the
implementation of new inventions. Midway into a capital
expansion, opportunities for applying new inventions that
require new types of capital become poor. The nation is
already committed to a particular mix of technologies, and the
environment greatly favors improvement innovations over basic
innovations. During a long-wave downturn, basic innovation
opportunities gradually improve, as old capital embodying the
technologies of the preceding buildup depreciates. Near the
trough of the wave, there are great opportunities for creating
new capital embodying radical new technologies. The old
capital base is obsolescent, bureacracies that thwarted basic
innovation have weakened, many companies committed to producing
old types of capital are bankrupt, and traditional methods are
no longer sacrosanct.
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Though innovation is not necessary to explain the long wave, there is
little doubt that each long wave seems to be built around a particular
ensemble of basic technologies, including particular forms of energy,
transport, communications, and materials. These ensembles evolve
synergistically and, like species in an ecosystem, compete against other
candidates for a limited number of available niches.
The impact of technology and innovation on the long wave itself, on
its strength, period, and character, remains less certain. The strong
influence of the self-ordering, labor, and interest rate dynamics suggests
innovation is not likely to be a high leverage point for countering the
long wave (Sterman 1983, Forrester et al. 1983). Much work needs to be
done to examine how innovation might feed back and affect the other
mechanisms that create the long wave. Can fluctuations in innovation
amplify the long wave? Can policies directed at stimulating innovation
shorten the depression period or reduce the amplitude of the long wave?
These questions remain, so far, unanswered. The proper framework for
addressing them is an endogenous theory of innovation and technological
change coupled to the other mechanisms capable of generating the long wave.
4.7 Political and Social Values
Substantial evidence exists that political and social values in
Western nations fluctuate with the period and phasing of the economic long
wave (Namenwirth 1973, Weber 1981). Independent content analyses of
political tracts in the U.S. and Great Britain revealed statistically
significant 50 year value cycles in both countries which coincided with
each other and with the phasing of the economic long wave. During periods
of long wave expansion, material wants are satisfied, and social concerns
turn to civil liberties, income distribution, and social justice. During
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the later phases of the expansion, foreign-policy concerns predominate. As
the expansion gives way to decline, conservatism grows, and political
attention returns to material needs. Economic policy takes center stage in
legislative agendas. During the downturn, the accumulation of wealth
becomes the overriding concern, at the expense of civil rights, equity, and
the environment. The most dramatic example of this cycle is, of course,
the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. The rebellion of the 1960s and
growing conservatism of the 1980s in many Western nations are also
consistent with the current long-wave cycle.
The variation of political values is primarily the result of
entrainment by the economic cycle. It is quite natural to emphasize
material needs during depression periods. People find it easier to be
charitable and to extend the rights and privileges of society during good
economic times when incomes are rising than in times of economic
retrenchment and depression.
As in the case of technology, the effect of social value shifts on the
severity and length of the long wave remains terra incognita. The
connection between political values and international conflict may be
especially important here, especially in view of the theories that relate
war to the long wave (Goldstein 1983). Long wave research should broaden
the boundary of analysis to include the effects of the long wave on
international relations, including trade, debt, foreign aid, and conflict.
5. Conclusion
The National Model has been the vehicle for the development of an
integrated theory of the economic long wave. Analysis of the full NM and
of simple models has shown that the long wave is a complex phenomenon which
1^___11 _ __ ___1_______II______ __
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influences a wide range of economic and social factors. In contrast to
several recent theories, the National Model shows there is no single cause
of the long wave. Rather, the long wave is the result of the interaction
of the physical structure of the economy and the decisionmaking of
individuals and firms. The long wave springs from fundamental processes
and structures in industrial economies. It is generated endogenously, and
does not depend on random shocks such as gold discoveries to account for
its persistence or for turning points.
In essence, the long wave arises from two fundamental characteristics
of economic systems:
1. Inherent oscillatory tendencies of firms. Due to the inevitable
lags in acquiring factors of production and reacting to changes in demand,
firms tend to amplify unanticipated changes in demand, creating the
potential for oscillation in the adjustment of production capacity to
demand.
2. Reinforcing processes amplify the instability. Though individual
firms are likely to be stable, a wide range of positive feedback loops are
created by the couplings of individual firms to one another, to the labor
markets, and to the financial markets. These reinforcing mechanisms
substantially amplify the fluctuations in the demand for capital created by
individual firms, boosting the amplitude and lengthening the period of the
inherent oscillatory tendencies of firms. The major self-reinforcing
processes are capital self-ordering, labor market interactions, and real
interest rate dynamics.
Because the NM represents the physical structure of the economy and
the decisionmaking routines used by individuals and firms to manage their
affairs, it generates the multiple modes of behavior most important in
26
D-3577
modern economies, including the long wave, the business cycle, government
growth and inflation, and the long-term growth of population and
technology. The model shows that it is possible to integrate in a single
analytic framework the processes responsible for each of the modes, examine
their interactions, and evaluate the likely effects of policies.
More importantly, diverse hypotheses and theories on the origin of
each of the modes can be integrated and tested rigorously and in a
reproducible manner. The relative strengths and synergies of the various
processes can be evaluated. The model thus provides a flexible framework
for the development of an integrated theory of economic dynamics and a
consistent understanding of the problems facing the world economy.
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NOTES
0. The contributions of my colleagues Jay Forrester, Alan Graham, David
Kreutzer, and Peter Senge are gratefully acknowledged. This work was
supported by the Sponsors of the System Dynamics National Model
Project. I am solely responsible for any errors.
1. Van Duijn (1983) provides an excellent overview of long wave theories
new and old. For innovation theories, see Schumpeter (1939) and Mensch
(1979). Freeman et al. (1982) focus on unemployment and innovation.
See Rostow (1975, 1978) and Mandel (1980, 1981) for theories based on
resource scarcity and class struggle, respectively. See also Freeman
(1983) for a survey of contemporary long wave theories.
2. Good overviews are provided by Hogarth (1980) and Kahneman et al.
(1982). See Morecroft (1983) on the connection of bounded rationality
and system dynamics. Nelson and Winter (1982) also apply bounded
rationality to macroeconomic modeling.
3. Hogarth (1980) and Kahneman et al. (1982) discuss numerous separate
sources of bias in decisionmaking. Common fallacies of causal
attribution include the gambler's fallacy and the regression fallacy.
4. For discussion of the issues involved in the identification of long
waves from empirical data, see Forrester et al. (1983). Anecdotal and
other descriptive data (e.g. Rezneck 1968) are extremely useful and
corroborate the timing of the long wave established through examination
of the numerical data.
5. Though population and technological progress are exogenous, they are
assumed to grow at absolutely uniform fractional rates. Historical
time series for population and technology are not used. Thus the long
wave and its timing in the simulation are not due to exogenous
variables.
6. See Metzler (1941), Mass (1975), Low (1980), and Forrester (1982), for
dynamic models of the business and Kuznets cycles that stress the role
of stock adjustments. For empirical work on the Kuznets cycle, see
e.g. Kuznets (1930) and Hickman (1963).
7. Exogenous random noise is still active in the simulation.
8. The multiplier effect can be derived by assuming that in equilibrium
(i) capital production equals the investment of the goods sector plus
the investment of the capital sector: KPR=GINV+KINV;
(ii) production is related to capital stock by the capital output
ratio: KPR=KC/KCOR;
(iii) the investment of the capital sector in equilibrium equals
physical depreciation. In equilibrium, discards are given by the
capital stock divided by the average life of capital: KINV=KC/KALC.
See Frisch (1933) and Sterman (1984).
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9. Simulated employment and capital stock in the capital sector are shown.
Because no historical time series are used to drive the model and
because of the noise included to excite the business cycle, the point-
by-point behavior of the model differs from the data. Nevertheless,
the model captures the qualitative patterns of the actual data
extremely well.
10. The real interest rate shown in figure 11 is given by the yield of
3-month Treasury bills less the rate of inflation as measured by the
implicit price deflator.
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Table 1
Major Variables in the National Model
Endogenous Exogenous
GNP
Consumption
Investment
Saving
Government Expenditure
Tax rates
Prices
Wages
Inflation rate
Employment
Unemployment
Workforce participation
Wealth
Interest rates
Money supply
Private debt
Public debt
Banking system reserves
Monetary policy
(open market operations)
Fiscal Policy
(transfer payments,
government purchases,
employment, deficit)
Sectoral variables for the
goods and services sector and
plant and equipment sector:
Production
Capacity
Capital stock
Employment
Investment
Price
Debt
Dividends
Return on investment
Taxes
Balance sheet
Income statement
Population
(constant 2 per cent/yr rate)
Technological Progress
(constant 1 per cent/yr rate)
Authorized government
services per capita
(constant exogenous
pressure for expansion
starting 1930)
Random noise in order
rates and production
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Figure la: Real GNP in the United States, 1800-1984
REAL GNP (1972 DOLLARS)
TIME
Figure b: Unemployment rate in the United States, 1890-1984
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Figure c: Consumer Price Index in the United States, 1800-1984
HISTORICAL DATA
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (1967=100)
Figure d: Interest rates in the United States, 1860-1984
Source: Homer (1977). 1860-1899: average yield on higher grade railroad
bonds. 1900-1975: prime corporate bonds. 1975-1984: Moody's AAA bonds.
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Figure 2a: Simulated real GNP, 1800-1984
SIMULATION: REAL GNP (1972 DOLLARS)
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Figure 2b: Simulated unemployment rate, 1800-1984
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Figure 2c: Simulated interest rate and price level, 1800-1984
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Figure 3
SIMULATION: COMPONENTS OF REAL GNP
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Figure 4
SIMULATION: OUTPUT DISCREPANCY IN THE CAPITAL
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Figure 5
SIMULATION: DELIVERY DELAY FOR GOODS AND CAPITAL
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Figure 7
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Figure 9a: Historical data: labor/capital mix in the United States,
Source: Kendrick (1961, p. 328).
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Figure 9b: Simulation: labor/capital mix in the capital sector, 1890-1945
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Figure 10a: Historical data: labor/capital mix in the United States,1947-1983
Source: US Dept. of Labor (employment); US Dept. of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis (investment expenditures)
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Figure 10b: Simulation: labor/capital mix in the capital sector, 1946-1983
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Figure 11: Real interest rate in the United States, 1960-1983
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Figure 12
SIMULATION: REAL INTEREST RATE
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Figure 13
REINFORCING LOOPS INVOLVING CAPITAL DEMAND AND INFLATION
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Figure 14
SIMULATION: COMPONENTS OF REAL INTEREST RATE
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Figure 15
SIMULATION: I
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